Introduction

Modern statutory competition laws such as the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974
(Cth) ('Trade Practices Act') evolved out of the common law, probably because of a failure of the private right of action to sustain the broader public interests in vibrant competition and free trade (see Donald and Haydon 1978. pp. 2-4; Letwin 1954 ).
Together with this evolution has been the development of the idea that markets, and the competitive forces operating independently in those markets, are best placed to make decisions about how societies scarce resources might best be allocated for the benefit and desires of the majority of consumers (see Hilmer 1993, pp. 1-6) . As a cornerstone of modern market economies like Australia, competition laws are now considered necessary to drive innovation delivering better quality products and services to consumers at lower prices by improving productivity and economic efficiency (being technical or productive efficiency, allocative efficiency and dynamic efficiency: see, for example, Hilmer 1993, pp. 3-5) .
The rationale of government regulation in implementing (and enforcing) competition laws is to keep modern market economies open for competition by limiting conduct that is detrimental to competition for the benefit of consumers (Hilmer 1993, pp 1-16) . Importantly though, these regulations should be directed to protecting the competitive process rather than favouring particular sectors of the economy (Hilmer 1993, p. 26) . However, a tension remains in some dealings with patents under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ('Patents Act') where the statutory patent privilege results in monopoly pricing or restricts access to the patent protected product or process more than the social advantage secured by the property right (see Landes and Posner 2003, pp. 372-385; Scotchmer 1991, pp. 30-32 ; see also, for examples, Gifford 2003 Gifford , pp. 1695 Gifford -1718 Carrier 2002) . Significantly, the privileges granted by patents under the Patents Act are of a different character to other forms of property (see Ergas 2000, p. 2 11), essentially being a right to the sale of the idea in the patent protected product or process, together with a statutory privilege to control how the patent protected product or process is used (Boldrin and Levine 2004, p. 328) . [1] It is this control of downstream uses of the patent protected product or process, and its leverage to achieve other business purposes that is the concern of competition law, recognising that it is only when a dealing (or a refusal to deal) with the patent protected product or process lessens competition in the 'market' that competition laws become relevant. [2] That is, where a patent holder refuses to deal, imposes anti-competitive conditions in proposed license agreements, or otherwise acts (anti-competitively) in a way that would not be possible without some form of market power. Australia provides a case study of the interaction between patent laws and competition regulations, illustrating the 'exceptionalism' granted to patents over broader competition concerns, and the failure to grapple with critical competition issues at the interface between patents and competition laws.
The current Australian consensus appears to be that the purposes of patents and competition laws are 'largely complementary' with patents promoting innovation, [3] and competition laws 'keeping markets open and effective' in order to 'preserve[] the primary source of the pressure to innovate and to diffuse innovations' (Ergas 2000, p. 6; see also United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 1995, p. 7). However, the actual boundaries between patents and competition law are a lot more problematic reflecting the different ways they seek to achieve their purposes -there are 'serious problems of assessing effects, but not conflicting purposes' (Bowman 1973, p. ix; see also Stonier 1984, pp. 22-25) . [4] As the laws currently stand, the Trade Practices Act seeks to promote the process of competition through rivalry between competitors for the custom of consumers, theoretically increasing consumer access to goods and services and reducing prices (Hilmer 1993, p. 4) . In contrast, patents under the Patents Act limit this competitive process by granting exclusivity to only some innovative ideas that satisfy the minimum legislated requirements for patentability. While the optimal scope and duration of statutory patent privileges is unknown (and unknowable), [5] 18). The place of legislated patent privileges, and in particular 'stronger' patent privileges, [6] in achieving these policy outcomes has failed to address the quality and performance of the regulation required by the high level
Competition Principles Agreement that forms part of the National Competition
Policy (see National Competition Council 1997 Memorandum 1974, pp. 4-8) .
This chapter examines these two areas of competition that might deliver better outcomes: first the benchmark for regulatory quality and performance according to the Competition Principles Agreement (CPA), and secondly the evolution and application of the existing pro-competition measures in s 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion and the conclusion that a detailed competition analysis of the patent privileges set out in the Patents Act, and their exercise according to the Trade Practices Act, has been avoided and should be addressed to deliver better quality and performing laws. Such laws are more likely to promote innovation without the detrimental effects of inappropriately restricted competition.
Regulatory quality and performance of the Patents Act according to the
Competition Principles Agreement
The Australian Government, as part of the Council of Australian Governments (CoAG) and its agreements, has undertaken an extensive review of its regulations and government actions to remove anti-competitive arrangements that cannot be justified to achieve an identifiable benefit or 'public interest ' (see National Competition Council 2003, pp. 13.1-13.7; Rimmer 2006, pp. 3-6) . This has included some institutional changes, related reforms to the electricity, gas, water and road transport industries, and various regulation reforms (see National Competition Council 1997).
The regulation reforms have primarily been implemented through the CPA (see Essentially, the objectives in conducting the regulation reviews are to assess whether the arrangements restrict competition; whether the benefits to the community as a whole outweigh the costs (including the broader assessment of the 'public interest') and that it can clearly be demonstrated that the benefits exceed the costs; and whether the same objects could be achieved by other better (more pro-competitive) means (Ergas 2000) . The Terms of Reference provided, in part, that the review 'shall have regard to: (a) the determination, in the CPA, that legislation which restricts competition should be retained only if the benefits to the community as a whole outweigh the costs, and if the objectives of the legislation can only be achieved by restricting competition' (Ergas 2000, p. 217) . However, the Terms of Reference also included specific matters that the review 'shall inquire into and report … on', including 'the objectives of, including the nature and magnitude of the problems 6 sought to be addressed by … the Patents Act 1990', 'the nature of the restrictions in the legislation on competition', 'the likely effect of those restrictions on competition', alternative means of achieving the same objectives, and the 'costs and benefits' and 'appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency' of the legislation, restrictions on competition and alternatives (Ergas 2000, p. 217) . These requirements are consistent with the CPA (Competition Principles Agreement cl 5(9)).
Ergas set out its vision of the impact of intellectual property privileges on competition, including patents:
… it is important to recognise that competition occurs in a number of dimensions. More specifically, firms do not only compete in the prices they set but also in their ability to develop new processes and to design and market new products. This dynamic competition is of special importance. In effect, rather than simply reallocating existing resources, it expands the resources on which society can draw and allows for sustainable increases in living standards. It is also important because in practice it is the main way established market positions are over-turned, and the threat of competition made into an ever-present constraint on the conduct of firms. An effective system to define and enforce intellectual property rights is critical for this type of dynamic competition to occur on a material scale (Ergas 2000, p. 5) .
Importantly, Ergas expressed the view that the interaction between intellectual property and competition was 'largely complementary' with intellectual property promoting innovation and competition policy 'keeping markets open and effective, preserves the primary source of the pressure to innovate and to diffuse innovations' (Ergas 2000, p. 6) . However, recognising that intellectual property privileges do have social costs, Ergas conceded:
Intellectual property laws must … involve some balance between the incentives to invest in creative effort and the incentives for disseminating material that is the subject of intellectual property protection. This balance turns on determining the appropriate scope of protection, in terms of the conditions under which protection is granted, the scope and effectiveness of the exclusive privileges provided by protection, and the duration of the protection given. Balancing between providing incentives to invest in innovation on one hand, and for efficient diffusion of innovation on the other, is a central, and perhaps the crucial, element in the design of intellectual property laws. In the Committee's view, it is essential that the terms of this balance be clearly set out in the intellectual property laws themselves, so that rights owners and users can be certain about the scope and content of the grants being made (Ergas 2000, p. 6 ).
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In addressing patents specifically, Ergas rejected the notion that Australia might apply a higher threshold standard to non-resident patent applicants (Ergas 2000, p. 139) , and presented a particular perspective on the benefits of patents in Australia:
… effective patent protection facilitates trade in technology, both domestically and internationally.
An effective patent system, accessible to foreign technology suppliers, allows Australian firms to import technology that would otherwise be unavailable, or would only be available at higher cost.
This increases productivity and enhances competition in the Australian economy. Ergas did, however, present some assertions in support of its perspective about the benefits of patent privileges. It argued that the private value of research and development was much less than the social value (Ergas 2000, p. 137) , and that patent privileges were the best system yet devised to balance the trade-off between maintaining incentives to invest and fostering the diffusion of new technology (Ergas 2000, p. 143) . Unfortunately these assertions, while not contentious as a generalisation, gloss over, for example, the hotly contested and disparate debate about the appropriate scope and allocation of patent privileges that Ergas itself had identified in discussing balancing incentives and exploiting intellectual property generally (see Ergas 2000, p. 6 ).
Interestingly Ergas did cite 'uncertainty as to which of several contending parties will receive patent protection and how much protection patents will afford' as an 'imperfection' in the existing patent privilege scheme (see Ergas 2000, p. 143 Having adopted this conclusion, the view that compliance with international patent standards was beneficial to Australia (Ergas 2000, pp. 27 and 139-141 ) and a part of Government policy (see Ergas 2000, pp. 216-217) , and its gloss on the debates about appropriate patent scope and allocation, Ergas accepted the existing legislated scheme for patent privileges and identified a number of improvements that might promote more competition in the application of the threshold tests and the duration of the patent term (Ergas 2000, p. 144) . However, these issues were examined from Ergas's particular concern about the economic effects of the certainty of the patent grant (Ergas 2000, pp. 143-144) , both granting patents that should not be granted and not granting patents that should be granted (see Ergas 2000, p. 153) . From this perspective Ergas considered threshold test improvements including requiring a specific, substantial and credible use be defined (Ergas 2000, pp. 151-154) and that the scope of prior art be expanded for assessing inventive step (Ergas 2000, pp. 154-156 and 168-170) . It was suggested that other requirements be restricted including prior use (Ergas 2000, pp. 157-159) and compulsory licensing (Ergas 2000, pp. 162-163) . On patent term, Ergas 'believed' there was not enough evidence to extend the patent term, although they did suggest that raising renewal fees might be applied to 'extract a lower economic rent' (Ergas 2000, pp. 144 and 156) .
While these assessments and recommendations certainly affect competition, the Ergas approach avoided assessing the contentions about the appropriate balance of patent scope and allocation and how this might be countered when the social costs were 9 judged to be too high (such as the appropriate threshold of 'public interest' before a compulsory license is to be granted are intended to achieve (see Ergas 2000, pp. 136-138) and to consider the most appropriate test in achieving this objective (see Ergas 2000, pp. 154-156) . Comparing the 'reward theory' and the 'prospect theory' illustrate this contention. The 'reward theory' views a patent as an incentive to undertake uncertain invention with an opportunity to appropriate greater commercial returns. This is considered to foster socially beneficial inventions, but with significant social costs on short term inefficiencies in the market from the anti-competitive effects of the patent (primarily restricted output and higher prices) appropriating public goods (ideas) that would otherwise be used (see, for example, Machlup 1958) . In contrast, the 'prospect theory' views patents as promoting the commercial development of inventions with patents granted to early stage inventions facilitating the bringing of a usable invention to the market and acting as an incentive to maximise the commercial value from exploiting the invention with relief from free-riders (see, for example, Kitch 1977; Merges 1992 ). These different theories pose significantly different consequences for shortterm competition. The 'reward theory' imposes high thresholds for patentability seeking to limit patents to only those inventions that would not have been made with significant concerns about the effects on competition. In contrast, the 'prospect theory' imposes lower thresholds giving the patent holder control over the development process and possibly increasing the efficiency of commercialisation (that otherwise may not occur) with less concern about the effects on competition.
Perhaps the major flaw in Ergas's assessments and report was that it adopted different approaches (or CPA methodologies) to different intellectual property statutes, a more rigorous approach being applied to the Ergas majority's consideration of parallel importing under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) that Patents Act patents. Significantly, the Ergas majority objected to many of the very same issues that were glossed over in its analyses of the Patents Act (Ergas 2000, pp. 134-178) . In addressing parallel importing under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) the Ergas majority was able to structure its analysis of the issues very differently, and reach a very different conclusion,
suggesting that the benefits of parallel import restrictions did not outweigh the detrimental anti-competitive effects, and that the restrictions should be repealed entirely (Ergas 2000, p. 5) . The contention here is that if Ergas had applied the same CPA methodology to Patents Act patents, the outcome would have been a more rigorous and informed analysis of the patent scheme in the context of promoting competition.
The Ergas majority accepted that copyright had a 'utilitarian justification of protecting and promoting investment in creative effort to secure, for the Australian community, gains associated with investment' (Ergas 2000, p. 61) so that the privileges granted needed to be 'assessed in terms of whether the benefits they may bring, in improved investment in, and access to the results of, creative efforts, outweigh the costs they impose' (Ergas 2000, p. 62) . Further, '[t]his assessment of the impact of the restrictions needs to include analysis of the wider costs and benefits associated with those impacts' (Ergas 2000, p. 62) . The majority's key concern about parallel import restrictions appeared to be market segmentation with the ability to then charge higher prices (and possibly restrict availability) for materials subject to copyright (Ergas 2000, p. 62) . In effect, this was an assessment about international exhaustion of copyright.
From this bases the majority was able to reject arguments about economic incentives to create (Ergas 2000, pp. 49-51 and 66-69) , prices and availability (Ergas 2000, pp. 51-53 and 64-69), remainder books (Ergas 2000, pp. 54-55 and 64) , marketing and services (Ergas 2000, pp. 55-56 and 66-69) , censorship (Ergas 2000, pp. 56-57) , piracy (Ergas 2000, pp. 57-60) , and economic analysis that favoured maintaining the existing restrictions (Ergas 2000, p. 65) , because they failed to satisfy the CPA criteria (Ergas 2000, p. 73) . The most significant difference between the majority's dealing with parallel imports and patent privileges was the detailed approach to addressing the analysis of whether a restriction on competition was justified:
The Committee started from the premise that restrictions on competition need to be justified. In other words, the Committee, consistent with the NCP [National Competition Policy] and the CPA, 11 accepts that the onus of making a case lies with those who would prevent, limit, or in other ways restrict, competitive forces from operating.
More specifically, we accept that those who would restrict competition should establish the restrictions are in the public interest, rather than merely serving the interests of particular producers. The Committee believes that this well-established principle -requiring those who
would restrict competition to demonstrate the need to do so -appears to be fully justifiable.
However, experience and analysis amply demonstrate the importance of competition in promoting efficiency and underpinning prosperous, open economies. It also demonstrates the frequency with which restrictions on competition, though claimed to serve wider interests, have been used to confer above normal profits on narrow groups at the expense of the community. A presumption, albeit a rebuttable one, in favour of competition, is consequently clearly reasonable.
Such a presumption also places the evidentiary burden on those best placed to demonstrate the position. The reality is that the benefits from restrictions on competition generally accrue to concentrated groups, while the costs of these restrictions are spread widely throughout the community. Given this spreading of costs, it is far more difficult for those adversely affected by restrictions to organise themselves and present their case, than it is for the direct beneficiaries to support the restrictions.
As a result, the Committee believes that it is reasonable to expect those who would introduce or perpetuate restrictions to provide convincing evidence of why the restrictions are in the public interest.
It follows that the relevant test is whether the material made available to the Committee establishes that the restrictions these provisions impose on competition confer benefits on the community that outweigh their costs.
In cases where arguments put to us appear weak, the Committee actively sought further information and tried to analyse the arguments in the best light. As a result, we are convinced that we have provided the differing points of view with a fair and thorough hearing (Ergas 2000, p. 61 With parallels to Ergas's approach to patent privileges, the Ergas minority view accepted the assumptions and assertions of benefit, and therefore concluded that parallel import restrictions in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) were justified:
It is true that the ability to restrict parallel imports gives rise to an economic rent in favour of the copyright owner. However this rent encourages innovation and investment, and is precisely the foundation on which copyright is based. Allowing parallel imports reduces the incentives to innovate or invest. It is submitted that the costs incurred in removing the restriction will exceed the costs (in economic terms) of retaining that power (Ergas 2000, p. 74 ).
The consequence of the Ergas minority accepting this approach, and this was certainly open to the minority, was to avoid the broader assessment of the anti-competitive effects of copyright and a proper assessment of the criteria set out in the CPA.
Significantly, these are exactly the flaws in Ergas's assessment of the Patents Act (and also the relevant parts of the Trade Practices Act considered below).
In response to Ergas, the Australian Government has amended the Patents Act and adopted new practices as follows:
(a) Expand the publicly available information (the prior art) that an invention is compared against to determine whether it is novel and involves an inventive 
The justification for the partial Trade Practices Act exemption of the
Patents Act
The objective of the current Trade Practices Act is to 'enhance the welfare of Australians through the promotion of competition and fair trading and provision for consumer protection' (s 2). This is achieved by restricting some forms of market conduct and market structures considered to be anti-competitive (Pts IIIA, IV and XIB), while allowing that prohibited conduct and structure if it can be justified to be in the 'public interest' (Pt VII).
[11] This balances competition as an important means to achieving economic efficiency, rather than competition as an end in itself (Dawson 2003, p. 32; Skehill 1992, pp. 94-96) , and targets particular horizontal, vertical and economic monopolisation practices that are likely to undermine that efficiency. [12] Thus, the Trade Practices Act 'is conducive to greater economic efficiency by the prohibition of anti-competitive conduct, but it is not creative of it' (Skehill 1992, p. 95).
The Trade Practices Act, however, does not generally define 'competition'. Instead relying either on prohibiting some conduct always considered to be anti-competitive (per se prohibitions), or prohibiting some other conduct and some market structures only when it has passed a threshold of 'substantially lessening competition' or a 'substantial degree of power in a market' (the misuse of market power) (Pt IV). These prohibitions are then relaxed for some dealings with patent protected products and Unfortunately, the application of ss 51 (1) and (3) Further, Ergas carefully noted that the Trade Practices Act was fashioned in a different economic era and probably should be subjected to its own independent review, whereupon the place of patent privileges might be more certainly addressed (see Ergas 2000, pp. 209-210 The Committee recognises that the IP legislation confers upon the intellectual property right holder a series of exclusive privileges designed to promote innovation. Given that these rights are conferred by legislation, they should be able to be effectively exercised even when this involves (as it generally must) the exclusion of others. However, these rights should not be capable of being used to go beyond the market power those rights directly confer. That is, the right holder should not be allowed to extend the statutory right into a wider right of exclusion with the effect of substantially lessening competition (emphasis in original) (Ergas 2000, p. 211 ).
Ergas received a number of submissions advocating that the existing Trade Practices
Act provision should be retained because of 'the importance which Australian industry and research institutes attach to the operation of s 51(3)' of the Trade Practices Act, 'the need to protect exclusive licensing arrangements, such as those underpinning the operation of CRCs [government funded research institutions]' and 'the need for certainty in intellectual property licensing' (Ergas 2000, pp. 207-208) .
Perhaps surprisingly, Ergas noted that '[s]omewhat paradoxically, submitters typically
admitted that the precise meaning of s 51(3) [of the Trade Practices Act] was highly uncertain, and yet they asserted that it had provided a firm basis for major investment decisions' (Ergas 2000, p. 208) . Despite this 'paradox', and the carefully riders about the Trade Practices Act being a competition law reflecting the times of its origins (Ergas 2000, p. 210) , Ergas appeared to consider that transaction costs pose a special barrier to the 'efficient use of intellectual property' compared to 'other property or assets' (Ergas 2000, p. 210) , and as a consequence:
… this means that it is essential that firms have the scope to enter into efficient contracts that involve intellectual property rights, free of onerous and ultimately counter-productive regulatory 21 burdens. Great caution is therefore needed in imposing on transactions in IP rights constraints that may be less costly when applied in other areas of property (Ergas 2000, p. 211) .
Despite its reservations about the drafting of s 51 (3) … we believe this balance can best be addressed through the following changes:
• repealing s 51 (3) Ergas also considered that:
The Committee also notes that the imposing of conditions in a licence, or the inclusion of conditions in a contract, arrangement or understanding, should also clearly mean the refusal by 
Conclusions
The policy objective set out in the CPA is to promote competition by removing unjustified restrictions on competition in Australia (Competition Principles Agreement cl 5(1)). For statute based intellectual property laws the Hilmer report expressed clear concern that these regulations potentially created barriers to entry that might restrict competition (see Hilmer 1993, p. 195) , and that the need for exemptions for certain license and assignment conditions from the Trade Practices Act were uncertain (Hilmer 1993, p. 150) . This chapter has examined the Ergas legislation reviews addressing patent privileges set out in the Patents Act and Trade Practices Act to assess the foundation evidence that might satisfy the requirements of the CPA.
These analyses show important controversial issues have been glossed over, even though such an approach was open to Ergas. Thus, a detailed competition analysis of the patent privileges set out in the Patents Act and their exercise according to the
Trade Practices Act has been avoided.
Perhaps the most revealing part of the Hilmer report was the recognition that '[r] egulation that confers benefits on particular groups soon builds a constituency with an interest in resisting change and avoiding rigorous and independent re-evaluation of whether the restriction remains justified in the public interest' (Hilmer 1993, p. 191) .
To address this particular constituency problem, the Hilmer report recommended that the onus of proving that the restriction on competition was justifiable should change from those advocating change to those advocating that the restriction on competition remain in place, or be imposed (Hilmer 1993, p. 190) . This was carried through to the CPA (Competition Principles Agreement cl 5(1)), although it does not appear to have featured in Ergas's review of patents. In contrast, the Ergas's majority's approach to parallel importing under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) expressly adopted this requirement (see Ergas 2000, p. 61 ). This suggests that a different approach and focus has significant potential to improve the assessment of patent privileges, and might be a guide to expanding the scope of analysis applied to the Patents Act and the Trade Practices Act in future reviews. Without applying the CPA's analytical approach and taking into account the outcomes of applying the CPA's analytical approach a good opportunity to deliver better quality and better performing regulations has probably been passed over. To illustrate this contention further, a critique of Ergas's dealing with the Trade Practices Act was set out.
Generally patent licensing and assignment arrangements might be expected to be procompetitive through exploiting the patent protected product or process and incorporating more economically efficient manufacturing and distribution facilities, workforces, other intellectual property, other transaction costs, other complementary factors of production, and so on, that might not be available to the patent privilege holder alone, or otherwise require expensive (and inefficient) duplication (see, for example, United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1995, pp. 5 and 16; Federal Trade Commission 1996, pp. 213-215) . However, not all licenses and assignments will achieve these desirable efficiency outcomes. The challenge for Pt IV the Trade Practices Act is to make these distinctions and provide 'a set of rules intended to ensure the competitive process is not undermined by the anti-competitive behaviour of firms' (Hilmer 1993, p. 25) . However, as the analysis in this chapter shows, there has been a failure to address in any detail the interface between patents and competition law, and whether license and assignment dealings 28 with patent protected products and processes should be treated any differently to other contracts, arrangements or understandings under Pt IV of the Trade Practices Act.
This is important as the Hilmer report stated:
There are compelling efficiency and equity arguments for ensuring that competitive conduct rules … are applied uniformly and universally throughout the economy, with exemptions or special treatment accorded only on demonstrated public interest grounds (Hilmer 1993, p. 85 Ergas, and earlier Samuel, accepted the need for the Trade Practices Act to provide some exemptions for intellectual property (Samuel 1999, p. 213; Ergas 2000, pp. 11 and 215 (including a refusal to deal: p. 213) 1999, pp. 196-200) , the effect of Samuel's recommendations were passed over by
Ergas and its assessment that expressly rejected the earlier recommendations (see Act that did not have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition were justified (Ergas 2000, pp. 213-214) . This was a surprising result as their express task according to their Terms of Reference was to subject the existing 29 statutory arrangements to the competition standard set out in the CPA (Ergas 2000, pp. 216-217) . In the present context, this is a requirement to demonstrate that the benefits of the legislated restriction on competition (the exemption from Pt IV of the … that the conduct prohibited is so likely to be detrimental to economic welfare, and so unlikely to be beneficial, that it should be proscribed without further inquiry about its impact on competition (Dawson 2003, p. 123) .
There is no doubt that some licenses and assignments that include conditions that fall While there is unlikely to ever be a complete resolution to the tension between patents and competition law, the failure of recent reviews, and particularly Ergas, and proposed legislative activity has been another lost opportunity to assess and develop better quality and performing regulation in Australia (see also see Stonier 1984, p. 80) . Perhaps Australia's contribution to this debate is to illustrate the 'exceptionalism' granted to patents over broader competition concerns, and the ongoing failure to 237-238.
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Unfortunately Ergas did not provide any support for this assertion. This is significant as the availability of alternative, substitute and imitated products and processes might be expected to discourage those seeking patent protection (with its attendant expenses, delays, and so on) and seek alternatives, such as trade secrets, and so on, which did not seem to be a concern expressed by those making submissions to the committee. 
